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THE JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA OF THE JUVENILE
COURT
SAMUEL M. DAVISt
INTRODUCTION: GENESIS OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
OVER CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Certain premises descriptive of the philosophical underpinnings of
the juvenile court are now considered self-evident.I They begin with the
observation that establishment in this country of a separate system of
courts to deal with the problems of children and youth occurred in the
midst of a spirit of benevolence, social justice, and concern for the
welfare of young people. A fundamental concept was that children were
not to be dealt with as criminals, but rather, that through the parens
patriae power of the state, they were to be treated as wards of the state,
capable of being rehabilitated. 2 Since delinquency was primarily a social
phenomenon, reclamation was to occur through application of the tools
of the social sciences rather than the familiar paraphernalia of the crimi-
nal process.3 Because the juvenile process was geared to protection, not
punishment, the juvenile proceeding was conceptualized as a civil and
not as a criminal proceeding.4 Indeed, it was regarded as a higher form
of justice than that obtainable in the criminal courts.5
The above principles are uniformly recognized as the raison d'ptre
of the juvenile court by those having any familiarity with the workings
of the juvenile process. While some voices may be heard today in de-
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. The author wishes to
acknowledge, with gratitude, the assistance in the preparation of this article of Ms. Phyllis P.
McSheain and Mr. James F. Martin. Much of the foundation for this article came from their work
in the juvenile courts seminar conducted at the University of Georgia School of Law in the fall of
1971.
'The question flowing from this statement is logical: If these truths are self-evident, why are
they the subject of inquiry and discussion, or, for that matter, why do they need restating at all?
The answer is not so obvious. The basic principles fundamental to the juvenile court's philosophy,
long taken for granted with the assumption that they have achieved full fruition, are not uniformly
manifested in modern juvenile court jurisdiction. For this reason they must be recounted, and
present juvenile court jurisdiction must be reexamined in light of the restatement of old principles.
2See. e.g.. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
1H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1927).
'See, e.g., Exparte Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908).
'Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 82, 84-
85 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
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rogation of what the juvenile court has become,' few are heard to decry
overtly the very existence of such a court or to question seriously the
underlying premises.7 Nevertheless, there are subtle indications that
many states have never fully accepted the notion of specialized treat-
ment of juveniles who have violated the criminal code. Commission of
a delinquent act8 which would be criminal if committed by an adult
represents only one aspect of juvenile jurisdiction; the juvenile court also
deals with truants, incorrigibles, runaways, and other "wayward" chil-
dren Most states have treated the latter conduct with solicitude and
'See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); In re Gault, 387
U.S. I, 78-81 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Alexander, supra note 5, at 92.
7Dean Wigmore, however, had very strong feelings that criminal offenses were simply none
of the juvenile court's business, and to the extent the juvenile court attempted to deal with criminal
matters, its existence was detrimental to the criminal law's objective of controlling human behav-
ior. Wigmore, Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1926).
'Most modern juvenile court codes limit the classification of "delinquency" to acts that are
in violation of state or federal law or local ordinance. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(8) (Supp.
1971); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(17)(a)
(Supp. 1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(7) (Supp. IV, 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(11)
(Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(e)(l) (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-802(b)(l)-(2) (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26,
§ 70-1(g) (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201(4)
(1968); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712(a) (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(2) (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(2) (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02 (Page Supp.
1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § I 101(b) (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3(F)
(1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-7 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202(3) (Supp.
1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(2)(3) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.010
(1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12(1) (Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.2(0 (Supp. 1971).
The old formulations, however, typically include in the classification of "delinquency" not
only what would otherwise be criminal conduct, but also incorrigibility, truancy, running away
from home, being in need of supervision, and any number of classifications relating to the child's
physical, mental and moral well-being. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-
204 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1972). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1101
(1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3204 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(13) (1969); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1569(9), 13:1570(A)(6) (Supp. 1972), §§ 13.1570(A)(3)-(5) (1968); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.015(5) (1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-02(g) (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 10-602(2) (Supp. 1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:2(11) (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN.
.§ 2A:4-14(l)-(2) (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(4) (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(9)
(1962); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4 (1966).
The remaining jurisdictions do not attempt to classify conduct as "delinquent" or otherwise,
but rather list all forms of conduct subject to juvenile court jurisdiction in one general group,
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a) (1962); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-11 (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1803 (Supp. 1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.020(1) (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit, 15,
§ 2552 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.2)(a) (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031
(1962); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040(1) (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-26 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT,
§ 419.476(I) (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-77(I)-(2) (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
158 (Supp. 1972).
'As pointed out in note 8 supra, a number of jurisdictions treat this type of behavior as
"delinquent" conduct. See statutes cited note 8 supra. Those jurisdictions that limit "delinquency"
to conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be criminal, treat other forms of misbehavior as
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benevolence and have paid proper respect to the philosophical aims of
the parens patriae theory.
The function of the juvenile court, however, involves more than
teaching manners to sassy children; its primary function relates to law
enforcement. 0 It is precisely in the exercise of this function that many
states are less willing to indulge in the traditional dual concepts of
diminished capacity and the promise of rehabilitation. Some jurisdic-
tions, for example, exclude certain more serious offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction," and others give the criminal court or the prosecutor
authority to decide in which court the case should be commenced.'2 Still
a separate classification, designated variously as "persons in need of supervision," "unruly chil-
dren," "wayward children" and the like. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(15) (Supp. 1971); CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(18) (Supp. 1967);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(8) (Supp. IV, 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(12) (Supp. 1972); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24A-401(g) (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-802(d) (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-1(i) (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. Ch. 119, § 52 (1965); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-201(5) (1968); N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACT
§ 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(5) (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
20-02(4) (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1101(c) (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3(G) (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 26-8-7.1 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202(5) (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 632(a)(18) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.12(2) (Supp. 1972); WvO. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.2(n) (Supp. 1971).
The juvenile court also exercises jurisdiction over neglected and dependent children, but since
this article is addressed to misbehavior of children, rather than to areas of conduct or status over
which they have no control, neglect and dependency are not covered here.
"Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1700, 1701 (1967).
"COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(17)(b) (Supp. 1969) (excludes crimes of violence punisha-
ble by death or life imprisonment when committed by children 14 years of age or older); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1159 (1953) (excludes capital offenses); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3)(A) (Supp.
IV, 1971) (excludes enumerated felonies when committed by children 16 years of age or older);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570(A)(5) (1968) (excludes capital offenses and crime of attempted
aggravated rape, when committed by child 15 years of age or older); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-15
(1952) (excludes crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment when committed by child 13 years
of age or older); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1969) (transfer to criminal court mandatory where
child is charged with capital offense); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(9)(a) (1962) (excludes crimes
punishable by death or life imprisonment); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4(2) (1966) (excludes capital
offenses); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-2(d)(1) (Supp. 1971) (excludes crimes punishable by
death or life imprisonment committed by children 14 years of age or older, unless the case has
been transferred to the juvenile court from the criminal court as provided).
One apparent argument for such exclusionary statutes is that the community may be outraged
at commission of the more serious offenses, no matter what the age of the offender, and it may
feel a need to express its social and moral disapprobation through the medium of the criminal
sanction. See Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect, & Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court. in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 44, 62 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962). This represents an abandon-
ment, or at least a suspension in certain cases, of the commitment to the rehabilitative ideal and a
return to the purely retributive concepts prevalent in the nineteenth century. See 2 J. STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81-82 (1883).
"E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (empowering state's
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other jurisdictions grant the criminal court discretion to transfer to the
juvenile court an older group of children beyond the juvenile court's
original jurisdiction, rather than giving the juvenile court original juris-
diction over such persons with discretion to transfer to the criminal
court. 13 A further device to limit the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
over offenses committed by children is the practice of setting a lower
jurisdictional age limit for delinquent children than is used to establish
age jurisdiction for other classifications of conduct." Perhaps the most
disturbing phenomenon is the failure of some jurisdictions to confer
attorney to make this decision); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.12 (Supp. 1971) (complaint alleging
delinquency is to be referred to the county prosecutor, who decides whether the public's interests
demand judicial action). In addition, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594A (1971), which grants
the criminal court discretion, in cases in which a child 14 years of age or older is charged with a
crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, to transfer the case to the juvenile court or retain
jurisdiction and try it as a criminal matter.
"
3ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 363 (1959) (maximum age limit for original juvenile court jurisdiction
is 16; criminal court has discretion to transfer to juvenile court children who have reached their
16th birthday but are under 18 years of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 635(a)-(b) (Supp. 1972)
(maximum age limit for original juvenile court jurisdiction over delinquent child is 16; criminal
court has discretion to transfer to juvenile court a child who was over 16 but under 18 years of
age at time offense was committed); cf. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.2)(d) (Supp. 1972)
(maximum age limit for original juvenile court jurisdiction generally is 17; juvenile court and
criminal court have concurrent jurisdiction over 17-to 19-year-old children charged with certain
enumerated offenses or conduct).
"New Hampshire sets 17 as the maximum age limit for jurisdiction over children alleged to
be delinquent on the basis of violations of law, but prescribes 18 as the maximum jurisdictional
age for children alleged to be delinquent on the basis of a wayward status or incorrigible behavior.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:2(111) (Supp. 1971).
Oklahoma defines "child" as a person under 18 years of age. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1101(a) (Supp. 1972). This jurisdictional age is applicable in the case of a child in need of
supervision, id. § I 101(c) (Supp. 1972), as well as a dependent or neglected child, id. § 1101(d)
(Supp. 1972). But a "delinquent child" formerly was defined as a male under the age of 16 or a
female under the age of 18. Ch. 282, § 101(a), [1968] Okla. Sess. L. 444 (repealed 1972). In a recent
federal case, however, this classification scheme was held violative of the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution, although on a different basis. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th
Cir. 1972). The basis of the court's decision was the unconstitutional differential treatment of males
and females according to age. Id. at 20.
Vermont sets 16 as the maximum age limit for exercising jurisdiction over delinquent children,
but permits a maximum age limit of 18 in the case of neglected children and unmanageable
children. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(a)(1) (Supp. 1972).
In a slightly different vein, South Carolina prescribes 16 as the maximum age limit in counties
having a domestic relations court and 17 in counties having a juvenile domestic relations court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(7) (1962). Counties having a city with a population over 70,000
according to the official [current?] U.S. Census have a domestic relations court, and counties
having a city with a population between 60,000 and 70,000 according to the U.S. Census of 1940
have a juvenile domestic relations court. Id. § 15-1103(1) (1962). A similar statutory scheme in
Maryland, prescribing a jurisdictional age of 18, except in the city of Baltimore, where, until July
1, 1971, the jurisdictional age was to be 16 years of age, was held unconstitutional on the basis of
the equal protection and due process clauses. Long v. Robinson, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971),
aff'g 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970).
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upon the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction; instead they provide that
in some cases the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is concurrent with
that of the criminal court. 5 Regardless of their form, all of these provi-
sions manifest a basic mistrust of the juvenile court and represent the
absence of a firm commitment to the juvenile court's rehabilitative
philosophy. 6
This limited faith on the part of legislatures (and in some instances,
the courts) is exasperating. Their interpretation of what occurs in the
juvenile process is distorted; they seem to be saying that the redemptive
philosophy of the juvenile court is laudable when dealing with "way-
ward" youth or childish pranks, but that when serious criminal offenses
are committed, the rehabilitative ideal must be abandoned in favor of
the retributive processes of the criminal law. Under a statute removing
certain offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the legisla-
ture thus decides ab initio those cases in which society's interests de-
mand punishment as an adult. When the criminal court or prosecutor
is authorized to decide in which court the case will be brought, decision-
making power is delegated to the party least qualified to make such
decisions. 7
"sConcurrent jurisdiction comes in many forms and degrees. In some instances the juvenile
and criminal courts are expressly given concurrent urisdiction over all children within the jurisdic-
tional age limit of the juvenile court. In others concurrent jurisdiction exists only with respect to a
particular age group, usually older children. In still others, concurrent jurisdiction is authorized
over any child charged with a certain offense or one of a class of offenses. Concurrent jurisdiction
also may occur on the basis of some combination of the above factors.
In whatever form or degree, the following jurisdictions provide for concurrent jurisdiction
between the juvenile and criminal courts: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-224, -241 (1964);
California, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 604(a)-(b) (West 1972); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 1I, §§ 2711, 2712 (Supp. 1970); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(6)(c) (Supp. 1972); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1806(l)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1971); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3213 (1956); Michigan, MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178(598.2)(d) (Supp. 1972); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 62.050 (1971); Pennsylvania,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-11-3 (1967);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-175, -176.1 (1960), § 16.1-176(a) (Supp. 1972); Wyoming, Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-115.4, .12 (Supp. 1971).
"One of the most oppressive examples is to be found in Georgia's new Juvenile Court Code.
The Code provides that a delinquent or unruly child found by the court not to be amenable to
rehabilitation or treatment may be committed to the Department of Corrections, which is the
agency that deals with adult offenders. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2304 (1971). This section is in direct
conflict with the very next section, which provides that no child shall be committed to a penal
institution. Id. § 24A-2401(a) (1971). Probably added as an afterthought, the provision allowing
commitment to the Department of Corrections is outrageous and is inconsistent and incompatible
with the aims and purposes of the juvenile court. The decision evaluating the child's amenability
to the juvenile court processes is properly made at the waiver stage, not at the disposition stage
following adjudication.
"See Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 311-
13 (1967).
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No offenses or classifications of offenses should be withheld from
juvenile court jurisdiction. Each case involving a juvenile should origi-
nate in the juvenile court, whose judge is a far better qualified function-
ary to decide in which court the case should be heard."8 In those cases
in which the interests of society and the interests of the child suggest
that he is not an appropriate object of juvenile court treatment, 9 the
juvenile court judge should be able to waive jurisdiction and transfer the
child to criminal court."0 The importance of this procedure is twofold:
The juvenile court initially should make the decision regarding handling
of the case, and the decision should be made only after a hearing has
IRThe presumption is that the child is amenable to treatment as a juvenile, and only upon a
showing that he is not should he be transferred to criminal court. The juvenile court judge is simply
better able to make such a decision. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 63.
"Perhaps the most relevant criterion is whether, in the opinion of the juvenile court judge,
the child is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation. There are other considerations as well. In an
appendix to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court suggested the following
criteria as helpful in a waiver decision:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated
or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which
a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime
in the [criminal court].
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile ....
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by
the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Id. at 566-67.
The above criteria have been accommodated as closely as possible in the new District of
Columbia Juvenile Court Code. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307(e) (Supp. IV, 1971). A number of
other jurisdictions have excellent waiver criteria also. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(d) (1962);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-16(b) (Supp. 1971); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 6(h)
(1971).
"
0Most jurisdictions provide for waiver of jurisdiction and certification or transfer of the case
to the appropriate court having jurisdiction over the offense. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1959);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-224 (1964); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 603 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4(4)(a) (Supp. 1969); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-2307 (Supp. IV, 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.02(6)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24A-2501 (1971); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 571-22(a) (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806(1)
(Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-
3214 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.72 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1971);
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been held on the question of waiver and transfer.21
The above discussion, quite general by intention, was necessary to
establish certain minimum standards of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion-both as to how jurisdiction is to be defined and how it is to be
exercised. The first basic premise is that in defining jurisdiction the
sociological and correctional principles that support the juvenile court
remain constant whatever the type of juvenile conduct involved. There-
fore, no exceptions (such as commission of specific offenses or commis-
sion of felony or capital offenses) to juvenile court jurisdiction are justi-
fied or supportable by logic or reason. Second, in the exercise of juris-
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170(1) (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2611(3) (1964); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-16 (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (1965); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.4) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125(1) (1971); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 7185-15 (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-603(c)
(Supp. 1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.080 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:21 (1964); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-15 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-27 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280
(1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page Supp.
1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.533(1) (1971);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-7 (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-1171 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-11-4 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-234 (Supp. 1971); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §§ 6(b)-(j) (1971); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-176 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.120 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-
5-14(3) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.38 (Supp.
1971).
2 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966), set forth two basic requirements regarding
waiver proceedings: first, the child has a right to a waiver hearing, and secondly, the child has a
right to be represented by counsel at such hearing. The Kent decision initially was limited in scope
since it was seemingly based on an interpretation of the requirements under the District of Colum-
bia waiver statute, rather than on constitutional principles. However, following references to Kent
in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the weight of authority now is said to favor the proposition
that the principles stated in Kent are of constitutional dimensions. United States ex rel. Turner v.
Rundle, 438 F.2d 839, 842 (3rd Cir. 1971) and cases cited therein at 842 n.l 1.
In any event, at the very minimum most of the jurisdictions that permit waiver of jurisdiction
require by statute a hearing on the waiver decision. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4(4)(a), 22-3-
8 (Supp. 1969); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307(d) (Supp. IV, 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(6)(a)
(Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(l) (1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-22(a) (Supp.
1971); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806(1) (Supp. 1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.72 (1969); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 26, § 70-16(a) (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (1965); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.125(2)(c) (1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-603(c) (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-280 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(b) (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2151.26(A)-(B) (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (Supp. 1972); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-1-4 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234(a) (Supp. 1971); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 6(c) (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176(a) (Supp. 1972);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.38 (Supp. 1971).
Some jurisdictions have reached the same result by judicial decision. In addition to the cases
cited in United States ex rel. Turner v. Rundle, supra at 842 n.11, see People v. Fields, 30 Mich.
App. 390, 186 N.W.2d 15 (1971); Hopkins v. State, 209 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1968).
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diction, the juvenile court is the only appropriate body to decide which
individuals are not amenable to treatment as juveniles and should in-
stead be treated as adult offenders. Both of these principles are the sine
qua non of a sound concept of juvenile court jurisdiction and of a full
and total commitment to the juvenile court philosophy.
Yet these principles are not always evidenced in modern juvenile
court practice. An examination of the available relevant data reveals the
conclusion that the fault is not wholly that of the legislatures. Despite
their occasional lack of faith in the efficacy of the juvenile process,2"
legislatures generally have sought to confer upon the juvenile court
exclusive jurisdiction regarding children alleged to be delinquent on the
basis of criminal conduct.2 To further safeguard the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court, legislatures have inserted provisions compel-
ling any other court before which a child charged with a criminal offense
might initially appear to transfer the case to the juvenile court for
further proceedings. 24
2See notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
23See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 351 (1959); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-4(1)(a)-(b) (Supp.
1967) (except for children 14 and older charged with crimes of violence); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-59 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(1)(a) (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301
(1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-11(1) (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 16-1803 (Supp. 1971); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-806(a)(1) (Supp. 1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570(A)(5) (1968) (except for
children 15 or older charged with a capital offense or attempted aggravated rape); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2551-52 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-2(a) (Supp. 1971) (except for
children 14 or older charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment); Micii. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178(598.2)(a) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.111(1) (1971); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 7185-03 (Supp. 1971) (except for children 13 or older charged with a crime punishable by death
of life imprisonment); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-603
(Supp. 1971e; NaV. REv. STAT. § 62.040(1) (1971) (except for children charged with a capital
offense); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169.29 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14 (1952); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-8-26 to -27 (1968); N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 713 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-279 (1969) (except for children charged with a capital offense); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-
03 (Supp. 1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A) (Page Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 419.476(1) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1965) (except for children charged with murder
and children over 16 but under 18 charged with any offense); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-5
(1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1171 (1962) (except for children charged with offenses punishable
by death or life imprisonment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-203(a)(1) (Supp. 1971); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 5(a) (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-77(1) (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 633(a) (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-158(1)(i) (1960) (except, in some cases
as provided, for children 14 or older charged with a felony offense); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.030 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-3 (1966) (except for children charged with a capital
offense); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12(1) (Supp. 1972).
The exceptions have been covered elsewhere. See statutes cited note 15 supra.
21ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 363 (1959); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 604(a) (West 1972) (chil-
dren under 18 years of age); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-65 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(3)
(1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-901 (1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-12 (1968); IDAHO CODE
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In the face of such a clear expression of intent, it is therefore
alarming that the courts in some instances have viewed these attempts
to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the juvenile court as an encroachment
upon the jurisdiction of the criminal court. 5 It is not true, however, that
all courts have jealously resisted the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to
the juvenile court. Indeed, in most cases in which the question has been
confronted, the courts have preserved the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court .2 This good record notwithstanding, the fact that a num-
ber of state courts have offended the concept of exclusive jurisdiction is
at once disturbing and surprising, since the courts were among the
earliest supporters of the juvenile court and its ameliorative processes.27
Georgia in particular furnishes an unhappy example of how the
juvenile court's jurisdiction has been curtailed and its capacity to deal
with juvenile problems hampered, despite the presence of clear legisla-
tive intent. The Georgia scheme of concurrent jurisdiction, fashioned by
the courts, touches on all the problem areas: the maximum age of
§ 16-1804 (Supp. 1971) (except where child is 16 or older and is charged with a felony offense, or
18 or older and charged with any offense committed before becoming 18); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-
3213 (1956) (except where child over 16 is charged with a capital offense); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.64 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571 (1968) (except where child 15 or older is charged
with a capital offense or attempted aggravated rape); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.886 (Supp. 1972),
§ 27.3178(598.3) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.115 (1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.061(2)
(1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-610 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-211 (1968); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 62.050 (1971) (except where capital offense is charged); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-20
(1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-28 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-09 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.25 (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(a) (Supp. 1972); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 419.478 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965) (except where child is charged
with murder; also, transfer of child over 16 but under 18 is discretionary); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 14-1-28 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1188 (1962) (except where child is charged with offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-209 (Supp. 1971); TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-I, § 12 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-79 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 635(a) (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-175 (1960) (however, if court is a court
of record it may, after investigation prescribed in id. § 16.1-176(b) (1960), proceed with trial of
case); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-3 (1966) (except where child is charged with a capital offense).
"See, eg., Jackson v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954); State v. Lindsey, 78 Idaho
241, 300 P.2d 491 (1956); State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18 N.W.2d 101 (1945).
21People ex reL Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967); Mallory v.
Paradise, -Iowa _ 173 N.W.2d 264 (1969); Commonwealth v. Franks, 164 Ky. 239, 175
S.W. 349 (1915); State v. Connally, 190 La. 175, 182 So. 318 (1938) (except over children 15 or
older charged with capital offenses or offense of attempted aggravated rape, as provided by
statute); State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957); Wheeler v.
Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374, 57 So. 2d 267 (1952); State ex rel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 321 Mo. 1090, 13
S.W.2d 1061 (1929); State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954); State ex rel. Slatton v.
Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963) (except over children charged with capital offenses,
as provided by statute); Gibson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 810, 177 N.W.2d 912 (1970).
"See, e.g., Exparte Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908).
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juvenile court jurisdiction, the age of criminal responsibility, the age at
which jurisdiction over a child may be waived, and the interrelationship
between all of these age factors in terms of dividing juvenile and crimi-
nal jurisdiction. Because the Georgia example deals with all of these
problems and does so in a clear historical context, it will be used as a
matrix within which to examine and analyze the jurisdictional dilemma
generally.
AN EXAMPLE OF SHARED JURVENILE COURT JURISDICTION-
THE GEORGIA EXPERIENCE
Intended Jurisdiction under the New Juvenile Court Code
With at least one notable exception,2 Georgia's new Juvenile Court
Code 9 on its face contains none of the evils described above. Patterned
after the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, it is a model of progressive
juvenile court philosophy and procedure.
The present age jurisdiction under the new Code is seventeen, al-
though it will be increased to eighteen on July 1, 1973.30 As under the
old act,3' and in keeping with traditional juvenile court concepts, 32 the
new Code reaffirms the notion that a juvenile proceeding is not to be
21See note 16 supra.
2GA. CODE ANN. tit. 24A (1971). For a complete discussion of the new Code in its entirety,
see Clark, The New Juvenile Court Code of Georgia, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 409 (1971).
30GA. CODE ANN. § 24-A-401(c) (1971).
"'No. 215, § 19, [1951] Ga. Laws 302, as amended No. 1021, § 10 [1968] Ga. Laws 1026-27,
provided as follows: "No action taken against a child under the provisions of this Chapter shall
be denominated as a criminal action nor an adjudication as a conviction; nor shall any child be
charged with crime or convicted by any court, except as provided in this Act."
2Virtual unanimity exists on the premise that juvenile court proceedings are of a civil and
not criminal nature. Almost all jurisdictions expressly recognize, in one form or another, the civil
nature ofjuvenile proceedings. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 378 (1959); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-207(A)
(Supp. 1971); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 503 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-9
(Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-72 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2318 (Supp. IV,
1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-49 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 53 (1965); Micit.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.1) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.211(l) (1971); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 7185-08 (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.271(1) (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-611(4)
(Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-206.03(5) (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.190(3) (1971); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:20 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-65 (1968); N.Y. FAMIY CT. ACT
§ 781 (McKinney 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-33 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.01(B) (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1127(b) (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 419.543 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 261 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1202 (1962);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-233(a) (Supp. 1971); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13(d)
(1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 662(a) (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 (1960); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.240 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.38 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-115.39 (Supp. 1971).
JUVENILE COURTS
regarded as a criminal proceeding. 3 The Code invests the juvenile
court with exclusive, original jurisdiction over all juvenile matters and
provides that it shall be the sole court for initiating action regarding any
child alleged to be delinquent, unruly, or deprived.34 A "delinquent
child" under the Code is one "who has committed a delinquent act and
is in need of treatment or rehabilitation. '35 The definition of "delin-
quent act" is substantially limited to violations of state or federal law
or local ordinance,36 with no attempt to exclude more serious offenses
as some jurisdictions have done.3 7
To emphasize further that the juvenile court's jurisdiction over
criminal-like conduct is exclusive, the Code provides:
If it appears to any court in a criminal proceeding or a quasi-
criminal proceeding that the defendant is a child, the case shall forth-
with be transferred to the juvenile court together with a copy of the
accusatory pleading and other papers, documents, and transcripts of
testimony relating to the case. It shall order that the defendant be
taken forthwith to the juvenile court or to a place of detention desig-
nated by the court, or release him to the custody of his parent, guard-
ian, custodian, or other person legally responsible for him, to be
brought before the court at a time designated by that court . . ..
In the case of a child who is fifteen or older, jurisdiction may be
waived and the case transferred to criminal court. Waiver and transfer
can occur, however, only after the judge has held a waiver hearing and
VGA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2401(a) (1971). This provision is somewhat more limited than
under the previous Act. It provides as follows: "An order of disposition or other adjudication in a
proceeding under this Code [Title 24A] is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil
disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service
application or appointment." The non-punitive nature of the juvenile court is also reflected in the
statement of purpose of the Code. Id. § 24A-101 (1971).
-Id. § 24A-301 (1971). The terms "delinquent," "unruly," and "deprived" are defined else-
where in the Code. Id. §§ 24A-401(e)-(h) (1971).
-Id. § 24A-401(f) (1971).
-Id. § 24A-401(e)(l) (1971). "Delinquent act" also includes two other categories of conduct:
(I) "disobeying the terms of supervision contained in a court order which has been directed to a
child who has been adjudicated delinquent or unruly," and (2) "patronizing any bar where alcoholic
beverages are being sold, unaccompanied by the child's parent, guardian or custodian; or possessing
alcoholic beverages." Id. §§ 24A-401(e)(2)-(3) (1971). "Delinquent act" does not include an offense
applicable only to a child (except as provided in subsection (2) relating to alcoholic beverages) or
a juvenile traffic offense as defined elsewhere in the Code. Id. § 24A-401(e)(1) (1971). Juvenile
traffic offenses are covered under § 24A-3101 of the Code.
3See statutes cited note 11 supra.
3GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-901 (1971). For similar provisions in other jurisdictions see statutes
cited note 24 supra.
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has found reasonable grounds to believe (1) that the child committed the
delinquent act alleged, (2) that he is not amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation, (3) that he should not be committed as a mentally re-
tarded or mentally ill child, and (4) that the interests of the community
demand that he be restrained or disciplined. 39
The operation of these statutes may be tested by a hypothetical
example. Suppose a sixteen-year-old child is taken into custody by the
police on reasonable grounds that he has committed murder. The fol-
lowing would seem to be indicated under the Georgia Juvenile Court
Code: (1) The child is under seventeen and is therefore within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (2) The juvenile court is the sole
court for initiating action against the child. (3) If the child is by mistake
or for any reason taken before another court, that court must immedi-
ately transfer him to the juvenile court. (4) Whether the child comes
originally before the juvenile court or is transferred to the juvenile court
from another court as required, the juvenile court may waive jurisdic-
tion over the child and transfer the child to superior court, if waiver and
transfer appear appropriate. (5) Only in the event of such waiver and
transfer by the juvenile court is the superior court authorized to proceed
against the child as an adult. Moreover, in the event the child were under
fifteen, the superior court would never be authorized to proceed against
him, since the juvenile court would have exclusive, original jurisdiction
that may not be waived.
The above would appear to be true, based on the clear meaning of
the pertinent statutes read together. But very serious doubt exists
whether this would be the case at all. Under the example above, the
superior court could take jurisdiction of the case if it so desired and
proceed against the child as if he were an adult, and it would not be
compelled to transfer the case to the juvenile court. How can this be
possible when the Code clearly provides otherwise? The probable result
today under the new Code has antecedents in the experience under the
old Juvenile Court Code.
Jurisdiction Under the Juvenile Court Act of 195140
The Juvenile Court Act of 195141 provided for exclusive original
39Id. § 24A-2501 (1971). Compare the criteria from Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966), quoted in note 19 supra. See also the waiver criteria contained in the statutes cited note 19
supra.
JrThe jurisdictional dilemma under the Juvenile Court Act of 1951 has been treated briefly
in Trotter, The Georgia Juvenile Court Act of 1951, 26 GA. B.J. 411,414-16 (1964) and Comment,
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jurisdiction in the juvenile court over any child under seventeen living
or found within the county who was alleged to have violated state,
federal, or local law." The language of the statute, based on the 1949
Standard Juvenile Court Act, came under attack almost immediately.
In Hampton v. Stevenson," the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the
Act of 1951 was challenged on the ground that it was unconstitutional
in light of a jurisdictional grant in the Georgia Constitution that pro-
vided: "The Superior Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction . .. in
criminal cases where the offender is subjected to loss of life, or confine-
ment in the penitentiary . . ."" The petitioner had been adjudicated
a delinquent in juvenile court and was alleging that the adjudication was
invalid, since under the constitutional provision mentioned the superior
court had exclusive jurisdiction of felony offenses. The allegation of
delinquency was that the petitioner had stabbed another person with a
butcher knife. The court avoided a direct jurisdictional confrontation by
holding that the proceedings in juvenile court are civil and not criminal
in nature and are therefore not in conflict with the constitutional grant
of exclusive jurisdiction to the superior courts. 5 The court thus left the
inevitable jurisdictional conflict unresolved, with no portent of how it
might be answered.
The General Assembly, meeting in November of 1953, was aware
of the conflict and was also concerned about a notorious case in that
same year involving the rape of an eighteen-year-old white female by a
black youth. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death by
Problem of Age and Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court, 19 VAND. L. REV. 833, 843-44 (1966). A more
recent treatment of the present jurisdictional conflict is Henritze, Persisting Problems of Georgia
Juvenile Court Practice, 23 MERCER L. REV. 341, 349-55 (1972).
4 No. 215, [1951] Ga. Laws 291.
2No. 215, § 9(1), [1951] Ga. Laws 297 (amended 1953).
'3210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953). See also Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 730, 101 S.E.2d
621 (1957).
"GA. CoNS. art. VI, § IV, l 14.
4"No. 215, § 19, [1951] Ga. Laws 302 (amended 1968) provided that no action taken against
a child under the provisions of the Act was to be regarded as a criminal action. The court in
Hampton clearly held that since a juvenile proceeding was a civil proceeding, the provisions of the
Georgia Constitution relating to the superior court's criminal jurisdiction were inapplicable. Im-
pliedly the court was saying that the juvenile court was the proper and sole court to hear such
matters. The real test remained, however. Where the superior court had taken jurisdiction over a
juvenile alleged to have committed a criminal offense, would the rationale in Hampton logically
compel a similar result-i.e., that juvenile matters were civil matters and a matter solely for
determination by the juvenile court?
"State v. Jackson, Crim. No. F-135 (Baldwin County Super. Ct., Aug. 28, 1953). The Su-
preme Court report of the case, Jackson v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954), does not
reflect the age of the black youth, except to state that he was under 16 years of age.
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the Superior Court of Baldwin County. A collateral attack of the death
sentence was pending before the Georgia Supreme Court. There was
apparently some feeling that the defendant might have been able to
avoid criminal prosecution for the rape since he was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 7 To remove this possibility the Gen-
eral Assembly amended the Act of 1951 by deleting the exclusive juris-
diction provision" and reducing the minimum age for transfer from
juvenile court to superior court from sixteen to fifteen. 9
The drafters of the Juvenile Court Code of 1971 failed to mention
this history in their comments to the new age jurisdiction provision. The
comment following section 24A-301 says only, "The jurisdiction under
24A-301 is exclusive; Georgia Code Ann., former 24-2408, merely gave
the juvenile court original jurisdiction without commenting upon exclu-
siveness."5 This statement, while not patently incorrect, is certainly
imprecise and misleading. It would lead the reader to believe that some-
thing new has been added to the new Code that will broaden the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court. While this ought to be the case, whether in
fact it is remains to be seen. In any event, the remaining history of the
provision in the Act of 1951 lends greater significance to the current
dilemma.
The case that caused the 1953 amendment was decided by the
Supreme Court of Georgia during its January 1954 term. In Jackson v.
Balkcom,51 the court held that jurisdiction to try a person accused of a
"
1Even in 1953 with the question still unresolved, superior courts were taking jurisdiction over
youth otherwise within juvenile court age jurisdiction, in felony cases. Otherwise the defendant in
the case mentioned would not have been before the Superior Court of Baldwin County at all, since
a literal reading of the statutes would indicate that the juvenile court had exclusive, original
jurisdiction over children under 17 and that the superior court could obtain jurisdiction only upon
transfer from the juvenile court.
To some extent a pervasive feeling still exists to the effect that youth who commit serious
offenses, especially inflammatory offenses such as rape, ought to be treated as criminals. Unfortun-
ately, this feeling exists among some juvenile court judges. At the 10th Annual Workshop for
Juvenile Court Judges, held during October 5-7, 1971, in Athens, Georgia, the chief topic for
discussion was the effect of the new Juvenile Court Code. The Code was analyzed section by
section, including § 24A-2701(b), which limits the duration of commitment orders to two years
(subject to renewal upon hearing). One judge who had just heard a rape case involving a white
female victim and several black youths, was heard to lament, "Now I have a boy [obviously under
the age of 15, or this judge would have transferred him to superior court] who has just been
convicted [this was the judge's word, not the writer's] of rape and aggravated sodomy. You mean
I can only send him away for two years?"
4 No. 555, § 3, [1953] Ga. Laws Nov.-Dec. Sess. 89 (superseded 1971).
"'No. 555, §§ 1-2, [1953] Ga. Laws Nov.-Dec. Sess. 88-89 (superseded 1971).
5 GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301, Comment (1971).
11210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954).
[Vol. 51
1972] JUVENILE COURTS
crime punishable by death or imprisonment was vested by the state
constitution in the superior court, and that any provisions of the Act of
1951 that were intended to withhold this jurisdiction were unconstitu-
tional. The court restated the conclusion reached in Hampton that juve-
nile proceedings were civil and not criminal in nature, but based its
holding on the fact that the age of criminal responsibility under then
existing Georgia law was fourteen52 and that nothing contained in the
Act of 1951 changed or superseded this provision. Even though the rape
in Jackson occurred on August 28, 1953, when the defendant was under
sixteen years of age and before the amendment in November 1953, the
court concluded that the trial and death sentence were valid because
jurisdiction to try persons charged with felonies who are accountable
under the law was fixed by the Georgia Constitution to be in the superior
court. 3
5 Former Code § 26-301 ([1833] Ga. Laws 143) provided that a person "who has arrived at
the age of 14 years, or before that age if such person know the distinction between good and evil"
was accountable under the law, following the common law rule that a child between the ages of 10
and 14 is presumed to be incapable of committing a crime, a presumption that could be rebutted.
Ford v. State, 100 Ga. 63, 25 S.E. 845 (1896) (mem.). The new Criminal Code, however, provides:
"A person shall not be considered or found guilty of a crime unless he has attained the age of 13
years at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-
701 (1971).
At this point an oddity occurs. Former § 26-302, ([1833] Ga. Laws 143) using language
identical to the present § 26-701, provided that a child under the age of 10 "shall not be considered
or found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor." The effect of this section was to create a conclusive
presumption of incapacity to commit crime on the part of a child under 10. Clemmons v. State,
66 Ga. App. 16, 19, 16 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1941). The Committee Notes to the present § 26-701 note
the similarity in language and state that § 26-701 is "to have the same effect" as former § 26-302.
This would seem to suggest that a child below the age of 13 is conclusively presumed to be incapable
of committing a crime. But elsewhere the Committee Notes suggest that the effect of § 26-701 is
to lower the age of rebuttable presumptive capacity to commit crime from 14 years to 13 years.
The two views seem to be inconsistent, but what the Notes are really saying is that a child
under the age of 13 has an absolute defense in a criminal prosecution, but nevertheless may be
proceeded against as a juvenile in a juvenile proceeding. Thus, despite the language of the Notes,
such a child is incapable of committing a crime but is not incapable of committing a delinquent
act.
Thus a distinction may be drawn between a crime and a delinquent act. The thesis of this
article is that this distinction operates to give the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over all
delinquent acts committed by children; the superior court does not have jurisdiction over crimes
committed by children, since, when committed by a child, such an act is not a crime but a
delinquent act. Only if the juvenile court waives jurisdiction and transfers the child to superior court
should the superior court ever acquire jurisdiction over a child accused of committing an offense.
Only'in this sense can the juvenile court and superior court be said to have concurrent jurisdiction
over juveniles who commit felony offenses.
'Thus any jurisdiction actually exercised by the juvenile court over persons between the ages
of 14 (age of criminal accountability under the then law) and 17 (maximum age jurisdiction under
the Act of 1951) who were charged with felonies was permissive only. Actual jurisdiction was vested
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In Armstrong v. State4 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the
voluntary manslaughter conviction of a fourteen-year-old girl and re-
stated the position taken in Jackson v. Balkcom: any part of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1951 intended to displace the jurisdiction of the superior
court over an offender within the age of accountability who had commit-
ted an offense punishable by death or imprisonment was unconstitu-
tional and would not be given effect.
What has emerged out of these decisions is a very shaky entente
between the juvenile court and superior court whereby the court first
obtaining jurisdiction over a child between the ages of thirteen and
sixteen (inclusive) may, if it wishes, retain jurisdiction over the child and
proceed to final judgment.- Thus, it is apparent from a reading of
Jackson v. Balkcom that if a child initially appears before the superior
court, it is not mandatory that that court transfer the case to the juvenile
court as provided under both the Act of 19516 and the new Code."
The Continuing Jurisdictional Problem under the Juvenile Court Code
of 1971
By resurrecting the exclusive jurisdiction provision and including it
in the new Juvenile Court Code, the legislature set the stage for potential
in the superior court in such cases, and jurisdiction by the juvenile court in felony cases was
exercised only with the tacit permission of the superior court, which always reserved the right to
try the case itself. The superior court apparently could bring a criminal prosecution against the
juvenile even after he had been adjudicated a delinquent in juvenile court, Whitman v. State, 96
Ga. App. 730, 101 S.E.2d 621 (1957). This appears to be against the weight of current authority,
which is to the effect that juveniles have a right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. See, e.g., Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968); Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55
(W.D. Tex. 1965); Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752
(1971); Tolliver v. Judges of the Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 104, 298 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-
2501(c) (1971), which provides: "No child, either before or after reaching 17 years of age (18 years
of age after July 1, 1973), shall be prosecuted for an offense previously committed unless the case
has been transferred as provided in this section."
190 Ga. App. 173, 82 S.E.2d 51 (1954).
OSee Jackson v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954) (child unable to complain of
improper jurisdiction in superior court); Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953)
(child unable to complain of improper jurisdiction in juvenile court). An obvious exception would
be in the case of a youth under the age of 15, in which case if the juvenile court obtains original
jurisdiction it must retain jurisdiction since the new Code permits waiver of jurisdiction only in
cases where the youth is 15 or older. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(4) (1971).
56No. 215, § 10(1), [1951] Ga. Laws 298. The Act of 1951 was amended in 1968, however, to
give a juvenile an apparent absolute right to be tried as an adult, presumably to counter the result
reached in Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953). No. 1020, § 4, [1968] Ga.
Laws 1021.
"
7GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-901 (1971).
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renewal of the jurisdictional question raised in Jackson v. Balkcom.
Under that decision serious doubt exists whether exclisive jurisdiction
in the juvenile court can be realized, since any attempt to withhold by
statute the constitutionally granted exclusive jurisdiction of the superior
court to try felony offenses would be unconstitutional. Certainly present
practice would indicate that juvenile court judges have conceded a share
of their jurisdiction to the superior court in cases alleging a violation of
law punishable by death or imprisonment. 5
From the standpoint of juvenile jurisdiction, this entente has re-
sulted in a particularly invidious practice. As has been pointed out, the
court first taking jurisdiction may retain jurisdiction. But suppose we
have a child who is thirteen or older but who has not yet reached his
fifteenth birthday. Suppose further that the juvenile court has knowl-
edge about the child that would indicate that he is not amenable to
treatment as a juvenile: the child has a prior record, has not responded
to previous rehabilitative efforts, and is now charged with a serious
offense. If the juvenile court takes original jurisdiction, it must retain
jurisdiction since the child is below the waiver age. The juvenile court
judge in such a case could informally request the district attorney to
proceed against the child as an adult.59
This practice operates as an informal waiver procedure. Such a
back-door waiver procedure denies the child a waiver hearing and abdi-
cates juvenile court responsibility to make a finding based on reasonable
grounds to believe that the child committed the act, that he is not
amenable to treatment by the juvenile court, and that the interests of
the community require that the child be treated as an adult.6 0 Some may
be comforted in the knowledge that such a child would be transferred
to the superior court anyway, even if jurisdiction over the child were
'This conclusion was reflected in the private comments of Judge Aaron Cohn of the Muskogee
County Juvenile Court, a past President of the Georgia Council of Juvenile Court Judges, at the
10th Annual Workshop for Juvenile Court Judges held in Athens, Georgia, on October 5-7, 1971.
Judge Cohn was of the opinion that nothing in the new Code changed the existing prerogative of
the superior court to treat a violation of law (i.e., a felony offense) by a child as a criminal act
and to proceed against the child as if he were an adult.
"This practice was acknowledged by Judge Cohn in his comments referred to in note 58 supra.
Viewed in light of the existing system, it is the best that juvenile court judges can do; what is
deplorable is the system itself, which forces such a practice upon the judges. The feeling of the
judges is that the waiver age ought to be lowered from 15 to 13, as reflected in the consensus of
those judges present at the 10th Annual Workshop for Juvenile Court Judges held in Athens,
Georgia, on October 5-7, 1971. This action, if enacted by the legislature, would afford each child
a waiver hearing in accord with the requirements of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
"OGA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(3) (1971).
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waivable, and that the waiver hearing is a mere procedural formality.
Such a practice, however, is in direct contradiction to the spirit of Kent
v. United States.6
This concept of concurrent jurisdiction is based strictly on the deci-
sion in Jackson v. Balkcom. In this respect, however, the Georgia courts
are not alone in the position they have taken. Idaho's Code, for exam-
ple, contains an exclusive jurisdiction provision6" and also provides that
if, during pendency of a criminal charge against a minor in another
court, it appears that the minor was under eighteen at the time the act
was committed, the court shall transfer the case to the juvenile court.,3
The latter provision does not apply, however, when the minor is sixteen
or older and is charged with a felony offense,64 or when the minor is
eighteen or older and is charged with any crime allegedly committed
before he became eighteen.65 The intent of these statutes seems clear
enough. However, the exclusive jurisdiction provision in a former identi-
cal statute was held unconstitutional because it attempted to remove
from the district court jurisdiction to prosecute such persons for felony
offenses."
The current provision in the Nebraska Code grants the juvenile
court original jurisdiction. 8 While it does not use the word "exclusive"
in the grant of jurisdiction, the Code does require other courts before
which a child might initially appear to transfer such child to the juvenile
court upon learning that he is a child under the age of eighteen or was
61383 U.S. 541 (1966); see note 21 supra.
"IDAHO CODE § 16-1803 (Supp. 1971). The jurisdictional age is 18, id. § 16-1802(c) (Supp.
1971), although jurisdiction also extends to persons 18 or older charged with violations of law that
occurred before they attained the age of 18. Id. § 16-1803(2) (Supp. 1971).
"Id. § 16-1804 (Supp. 1971).
"Id. See also id. § 16-1806(l)(a) (Supp. 1971).
"Id. See also id. § 16-1806(1)(b) (Supp. 1971).
"The constitutional provision affected was IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 20, which granted jurisdic-
tion over felony offenses to the district court.
"State v. Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 244-46, 300 P.2d 491, 493-94 (1956). In the Lindsey case,
however, the minor was handled as a juvenile, and he was the party who sought to be treated as
an adult. To this extent, the Lindsey case resembles the Georgia case of Hampton v. Stevenson,
210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953), although in Lindsey the Idaho court confronted and answered
the jurisdictional question dodged by the Georgia court in Hampton. The Lindsey case seems to
be limited, however, to cases in which the juvenile wishes to waive his right to be treated as a
juvenile and to assert his right to be tried as an adult. In Georgia the same result was reached by
legislative enactment following the Hampton case, permitting the juvenile to assert his right to be
tried as an adult. No. 1020, § 4, [1968] Ga. Laws 1021.
"NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202 (1968). The juvenile court is a division of the district court sitting
in cases arising under the Juvenile Court Act.
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under the age of eighteen at the time the act was committed. 9 Neverthe-
less, the Nebraska courts have held that the juvenile court does not have
exclusive jurisdiction over children under eighteen years of age and that
other courts have concurrent jurisdiction when a juvenile is charged with
a violation of law. A complaint may properly be brought against a child
by the county attorney in a court having general criminal jurisdiction,
and that court may proceed to judgment in the case.70
All of these decisions bear a certain similarity in terms of their
expressed rationale. Consequently they are equally vulnerable to the
same arguments. Certainly the viability of the rationale in Jackson v.
Balkcom in regard to the present Georgia Juvenile Court Code is open
to question. The crux of the Jackson decision was as follows:
While there is language in . . . the Juvenile Court Act of 1951
which might indicate that it was the intention of the General Assembly
to give original jurisdiction to the juvenile courts in all cases pertaining
to criminal charges against persons less than seventeen years of age,
there is nothing in the act which would have the effect of repealing
Code § 26-301, which states the age of criminal responsibility to be
"14 years, or before that age if such person know the distinction be-
tween good and evil." Jurisdiction to try persons charged with felonies,
who are accountable under the law, is fixed by the Constitution to be
in the superior courts.7
There are several arguments that could be offered against applica-
tion of this same reasoning to the present Juvenile Court Code. First,
in terms of the application of the criminal law, the age of criminal
responsibility is now set at thirteen, and the presumption is conclusive
(rather than rebuttable) that no one under thirteen is capable of commit-
ting a crime.72 Establishing an age of accountability only indicates ca-
pacity to commit a crime. There is nothing inconsistent between estab-
lishing an age of accountability under the criminal law at thirteen and
setting a juvenile jurisdiction age limit at, for example, seventeen. This
does not represent, as the court in Jackson suggested, an attempt to
raise the age of accountability to seventeen. 73 It merely indicates a
191d. § 43-211 (1968). The jurisdictional age is set at 18. Id. § 43-201(4) (1968).
7 State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 760-61, 18 N.W.2d 101, 106 (1945), citing the Georgia case
of Johnson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 474, 159 S.E. 295 (1931). See also Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb.
70, 75-76, 91 N.W.2d 240, 243-44 (1958).
11210 Ga. at 414, 80 S.E.2d at 320.
"GA. CODE ANN. § 26-701 (1971); see note 52 supra for the effect of the new statute.
"But see Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374, 57 So.2d 267 (1952), wherein the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that the legislature, by enacting the Youth Court Act, in effect declared that
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preference that the initial decision of how the child should be treated
should be made by the juvenile court,74 and if the court feels that a child
is not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation, it may waive jurisdic-
tion after a hearing and transfer the case to the superior court, which
will then have jurisdiction to try the juvenile as an adult.7" The juvenile,
then under the jurisdiction of the criminal law and over thirteen, will
be deemed capable of committing a crime and will be an appropriate
subject for the criminal process.
Other jurisdictions faced with the same question have resolved the
problem in a manner that is at once constitutionally sound and consis-
tent with the principles and purposes of modern juvenile court philoso-
phy. The Minnesota Constitution, for example, provides: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction . . .[in all criminal cases] where
the punishment shall exceed three months' imprisonment or a fine of
more than one hundred dollars . . . ."I A statutory grant of jurisdic-
tion, however, confers upon the juvenile court original, exclusive juris-
diction.7 1 Moreover, any court before which a child might initially ap-
pear is required to transfer such child to the juvenile court upon learning
that he is a child subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction.78 Waiver of
jurisdiction is authorized in the case of a child fourteen or older at the
time the act was allegedly committed.7 1
A seventeen-year-old child8 1 was convicted in district court (a court
of general criminal jurisdiction, as set forth in the above constitutional
provision) without any waiver proceedings occurring in the juvenile
court. In a subsequent post-conviction proceeding,"' the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that the district court was without jurisdiction. The
court further held that the Juvenile Court Act did not deprive the district
court of jurisdiction but simply furnished procedures (i.e., waiver proce-
dures) that must be followed before the criminal jurisdiction of the
a child under the age of 18, which is the jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court (Miss. CODE
ANN. § 7185-02 (1952)), is not criminally responsible unless the juvenile court decides to waive
jurisdiction and transfer the case to circuit court. 213 Miss. at 399, 57 So. 2d at 279.
7 Hence, the new Code confers upon the juvenile court exclusive, original jurisdiction. GA.
CODE ANN. § 24A-301 (1971).
75See GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (1971) for provisions relating to the waiver hearing.
7 MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 5. An amendment to this section has been proposed and will be
passed upon in the 1972 general election, but its only change is to grant the district court jurisdic-
tion over all criminal cases. Ch. 957, § 1, [1971] Minn. Laws 2030.
"The current provision is MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.111(1) (1971).
'The current provision is Id. § 260.115 (1971).
"The current provision is Id. § 260.125(l) (1971).
"The jurisdictional age in Minnesota is 18. Id. § 260.015(2) (1971).
"State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957).
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district court could attach. The court therefore found no conflict be-
tween the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the district court and
the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the juvenile court.82
Similarly, the Mississippi Constitution provides: "The circuit court
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this
state not vested by this Constitution in some other court. . . ."83 The
juvenile court by statute is granted original, exclusive jurisdiction. 4
While children thirteen years of age or older charged with commission
of a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death are expressly ex-
cluded from the juvenile court's jurisdiction, 5 no child under thirteen
may be the subject of a criminal prosecution." In the case of a child
thirteen years of age or older charged with a felony offense, jurisdiction
may be waived and the case certified to the circuit court for criminal
prosecution.87
A child under the age of eighteen8 8 was convicted in circuit court
of grand larceny. In a post-conviction proceeding89 he attacked his con-
viction on the ground that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over him.
In an exhaustive treatment of all previous juvenile court acts, the Missis-
sissippi Supreme Court concluded that the Youth Court Act in effect
declares that a person under the age of eighteen is not criminally respon-
sible unless the Youth Court after investigation waives jurisdiction and
transfers the case to the circuit court." A provision for waiver and
transfer was held to be within the constitutional police powers of the
legislature.9 Moreover, the court noted that the Youth Court Act de-
clares that a proceeding in juvenile court is not a criminal proceeding
but is civil in nature.92 Since it was not a civil proceeding known at
common law, it did not come within the ambit of the constitutional
grant of jurisdiction, which is confined to civil matters known at com-
mon law.93
12d. at 250-51, 82 N.W.2d at 237-38. See also State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d
696 (1960); State ex reL Pett v. Jackson, 252 Minn. 418, 90 N.W.2d 219 (1958).
"MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 156.
8
'MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-03 (Supp. 1971).
-1d. § 7185-15 (1952).
-Id. § 7185-17 (1952).
-Id. § 7185-15 (1952).
'mThe jurisdictional age of the juvenile court in Mississippi is 18. Id. § 7185-02(c) (1952).
"'Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374, 57 So. 2d 267 (1952).
"'In Oklahoma, the determination of a child's criminal responsibility is a part of the waiver
decision. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (Supp. 1972).
1'213 Miss. at 399, 57 So. 2d at 279.
12MIss. CODE ANN. § 7185-08 (1952).
11213 Miss. at 399-400, 57 So. 2d at 279.
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Likewise, the Georgia statute is not an attempt to withhold jurisdic-
tion from any court. It is not so much a question of where the case will
be heard as it is a qustion of who is best qualified to decide where the
case will be heard. The waiver decision is a correctional decision and
should be made only by the juvenile court after a hearing. If, as the court
said in Jackson v. Balkcom, it "is entirely in sympathy with the benefi-
cient purposes" of the juvenile court,94 it must be willing to let the
juvenile court decide in which cases the interests of the community as
well as those of the child suggest that he should be transferred to the
superior court.
The second argument against present application of the reasoning
in Jackson v. Balkcom arises out of the first. Establishment of an age
of accountability under the criminal law has reference only to capacity
to commit a crime. Likewise, the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to
superior courts refers to criminal cases. Under the new Juvenile Court
Code not only are juvenile proceedings of a civil nature; the act of a
child that is designated a crime under local, state, or federal law is a
delinquent act91 5 and not a crime, and makes the child a delinquent child,
not a criminal.9"
Again, other jurisdictions have recognized the distinction between
a crime and a delinquent act9" and on this basis have forged a clear
separation of juvenile and criminal jurisdiction. The West Virginia Con-
stitution, for example, grants to the circuit courts "original and general
jurisdiction . . . of all crimes and misdemeanors."98 Except in the case
of children charged with offenses punishable by life imprisonment or
death,9" the juvenile court by statute is given exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving children"'0 accused of criminal violations.'' Jurisdiction
over a child sixteen years of age or older may be waived and the case
transferred to the appropriate court having criminal jurisdiction.'
Under this statutory scheme a fifteen-year-old child was convicted
"210 Ga. at 414, 80 S.E.2d at 320.
'"GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(e)(1) (1971).
"Id. § 24A-401(f) (1971).
"The distinction drawn is real and valid and fundamental to the rehabilitative purposes of the
juvenile court. See People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 444-45, 435 P.2d 763,
766 (1967).
"W. VA. C( 'ST. art. VIII, § 12.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4(2) (1966).
11A child is a person under 18 years of age. Id. § 49-5-2 (Supp. 1972).
"0id. § 49-5-3 (1966).
"Id. § 49-5-14(3) (1966).
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in the circuit court of breaking and entering and was sentenced to a term
in the state penitentiary. In a post-conviction proceeding," 3 he claimed
that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to sentence him. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that there was no provision
in the Code for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to circuit court of
children under sixteen years of age. Therefore, it felt that the legislature
must have intended that such children were incapable of commission of
crime, except for capital offenses. Granting exclusive jurisdiction in such
cases to the juvenile court was held not to divest the circuit court of its
criminal jurisdiction, because by definition the conduct complained of
was not a crime at all. 04
The same result has been reached by the Colorado courts. The
Colorado Constitution provides: "The district courts . . . shall have
original jurisdiction in all . . . criminal cases .. . .",0- The juvenile
court by statute is granted exclusive, original jurisdiction in children's
cases,' except for children fourteen and older charged with commission
of crimes of violence punishable by life imprisonment or death.17 Juris-
diction over children fourteen or older charged with felony offenses may
be waived. 08 The statutes further provide that with the exception of a
child fourteen or older charged with commission of a crime of violence
punishable by life imprisonment or death, a child may be charged with
a felony only upon waiver of jurisdiction as provided."' A child is a
person under the age of eighteen." 0
Two seventeen-year-old Colorado youths were charged by indict-
ment with felony offenses in the district court. They filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer the proceedings to juvenile
court. Upon the court's denial of the motion, they brought an original
'State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
111147 W. Va. at 683-85, 130 S.E.2d at 198-99. In accord, the Minnesota Code provides that
a violation of law by a child under the age of 18 is not a crime unless jurisdiction is waived as
provided by statute and the case is transferred for prosecution as a criminal matter. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.215(l) (1971). To the contrary, however, the Missouri Supreme Court has said that
violation of the criminal law by a person within the jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court is
still a crime; the Juvenile Court Act simply made it also an act of delinquency. State ex rel. Boyd
v. Rutledge, 321 Mo. 1090, 1099, 13 S.W.2d 1061, 1065 (1929). Perhaps the respective dates of
these pronouncements explain the difference between them.
"'COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 9(1).
'
0 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-4(l)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1967).
'10he current provision is id. § 22-1-3(17)(b) (Supp. 1969).
"-The current provision is id. § 22-1-4(4)(a) (Supp. 1969).
"'The current provision is id. § 22-1-4(4) (b) (Supp. 1969).
"
0 d. § 22-1-3(3) (Supp. 1967).
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proceeding"' in the Colorado Supreme Court challenging the district
court's jurisdiction. That court was of the opinion that the provisions
of the Children's Code did not operate to divest the district court of its
jurisdiction, because, by its terms the grant of jurisdiction to the district
court extended to criminal cases. A delinquency proceeding, however,
is not a criminal case even when when the allegation of delinquency rests
upon conduct that if committed by an adult would be felonious. On the
basis of this qualitative distinction, the court held that the jurisdictional
provisions of the Children's Code were not in conflict with the constitu-
tional grant of jurisdiction to the district court."2
This suggests that when a child, as defined by the Georgia Juvenile
Court Code, 13 commits an act that would be criminal if committed by
an adult, he is initially to be regarded as a subject for juvenile court
jurisdiction. At this initial stage he has not committed a crime, and the
case is not a criminal case. The child must be brought before the juvenile
court, or if he has been brought before some other court, he must
immediately be transferred to the juvenile court as commanded by stat-
ute."' The case does not become a criminal case subject to the superior
court's constitutional jurisdiction unless the case is transferred to the
superior court following a waiver hearing as provided in the Code.",
Once the case becomes a criminal case to be tried by the superior court,
then the age of criminal responsibility becomes a relevant considera-
tion.'
The preceding discussion is consistent with the aims and purposes
of the juvenile court and the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the
superior court. An appropriate solution that would leave little doubt of
legislative intent would be to amend the Georgia Constitution specifi-
cally to remove juveniles from the jurisdiction of the superior court
except upon waiver from the juvenile court.17 In any event, clarification
"'People ex rel. Rodello v. District Court, 164 Colo. 530, 436 P.2d 672 (1968).
112164 Colo. at 535, 436 P.2d at 675. See also People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo.
437, 444-45, 435 P.2d 763, 766 (1967).
"'GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(c) (1971).
"Id. § 24A-901 (1971).
1id. § 24A-2501(a) (1971).
"'See note 52 supra.
"'In fact an amendment to the Georgia Constitution was proposed by resolution in the 1972
session of the General Assembly and will appear on the ballot in the 1972 general election. Article
VI, § VI, I of the Georgia Constitution would read as follows: "The Superior Courts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction in . . . criminal cases where the offender is subjected to loss of life or
confinement in the penitentiary except in the case of juvenile offenders as provided by law . .. .
No. - [1972] Ga. Laws 1544-45.
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is needed in the area of age jurisdiction: the present age limit of juvenile
court jurisdiction is seventeen;"' the minimum age for waiver is set at
fifteen;" 9 and the age of criminal responsibility is set at thirteen., This
proliferation of age factors has contributed to the problem, and until
some effort is made to understand the interaction between the various
ages, the problem will persist. In the section that follows, the respective
functions of the age limitations and their interrelationships within the
confines of the juvenile-criminal systems will be explored further and an
alternative solution will be proposed.12'
THE AGE FACTOR IN JUVENILE JURISDICTION
As seen in the previous discussion, the court in Jackson v. Balkcom
placed great reliance on the conclusion that the only limitation on supe-
rior court jurisdiction to try felony offenses, insofar as children under
seventeen were concerned, was that such a child, in order to be account-
able, had to be thirteen years of age or older. If a child was accountable
he could be tried in the superior court, and no provision of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1951 could withhold that jurisdiction. For example, under
the statute describing murder as a crime, 122 no exception is made regard-
ing to whom the statute will apply. On its face it applies to all persons
committing such an act. The only limitation affecting a child is that
persons under the age of thirteen are deemed incapable of committing
the act of murder or any other crime. 23 Therefore, any child who is
thirteen or older is a proper subject of superior court jurisdiction, re-
gardless of anything said in the Juvenile Court Code to the effect that
the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over all persons under seventeen
charged with committing such an act.
What this interpretation overlooks, however, is that the Juvenile
Court Code provides that murder, when committed by a person under
seventeen, is not a crime but a delinquent act.lu Establishing the juvenile
jurisdiction age limit at seventeen changes the nature of the act, whereas
establishing an accountability age limit at thirteen merely relates to the
capacity to commit the act. By virtue of being under seventeen, a child
"'GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(c) (1971).
1id. § 24A-2501(a)(4) (1971).
I-Id. § 26-701 (1971).
"'To some extent the age factors have already been examined. See note 52 supra.
'VGA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1971).
'Id. § 26-701 (1971).
i41d. § 24A-401(e)(1) (1971); see notes 95-116 supra and accompanying text.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
initially is an object of juvenile court jurisdiction; his age classification
changes the definitional status of his act. The age of accountability, for
purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction, has no meaning, no relevance,
and no application.'2 On the other hand, if the juvenile court upon
investigation decides that the case is appropriate for waiver of jurisdic-
tion and transfer to the superior court, the jurisdictional shield is with-
drawn from the child, and he becomes vulnerable to the usual applica-
tion of the criminal law. The juvenile court thus returns him to the
posture he would have assumed had the juvenile court not existed. The
initial relevance of the seventeen-year-old age limitation disappears, and
the age of accountability assumes new relevance. Since the child is over
thirteen, he is regarded under the criminal law as capable of committing
a crime and can be tried as an adult.
These two age limitations are easily understood in their relation-
ship to one another. Confusion occurs only when the waiver age (fifteen
in Georgia) is considered as a part of the formula. It has nothing to do
with jurisdiction or accountability. Its only relevance is that the juvenile
court cannot waive jurisdiction over a child unless he is at least fifteen
years old."' If jurisdiction is exercised properly and all persons under
seventeen are first referred to the juvenile court as anticipated in the
Juvenile Court Code, then no child thirteen or fourteen years of age will
ever be transferred to the superior court since the statute does not
permit waiver of jurisdiction in such cases. This does create a conflict
between the age of accountability and the permissible waiver age. The
practical effect is to raise the age of accountability from thirteen to
fifteen years of age, which frustrates the intent of the Criminal Code
and creates disharmony between the juvenile and criminal systems.
This conflict results in some cases arbitrarily being withheld from
the superior court's jurisdiction.121 Moreover, it does violence to the
12See discussion in note 73 supra; cf. In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cu.
Rptr. 671 (1970), which held that in a juvenile proceeding the court must consider whether the child
appreciated the wrongfulness of her act in determining whether the child should be adjudicated a
ward of the state (the child was under the age of 14, which is California's age of presumptive
incapacity). Thus California takes the view that the age of accountability is a relevant factor in a
juvenile proceeding as well as a criminal proceeding. This is clearly not the case in Georgia. See
note 52 supra.
'GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(4) (1971).
'2It makes no more sense arbitrarily to withhold a certain class of cases-those involving 13
and 14 year-olds-from superior court jurisdiction than it does to exclude certain classes of offen-
ses-e.g., crimes punishable by death or imprisonment-from the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
There may be factors in a 13 or 14 year-old child's case that suggest he is not amenable to treatment
or rehabilitation, but under the present statutory scheme the juvenile court judge has no choice.
He is bound by statute to retain jurisdiction once it is assumed.
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argument offered earlier that the juvenile court merely seeks to be the
sole decisionmaking functionary that determines in which court the case
should be heard. Prohibition of waiver in cases involving the thirteen-
to fifteen-year-old age group exceeds this function and results in inevita-
ble conflict. Out of this conflict Jackson v. Balkcom was born, and the
concurrent jurisdiction spawned by Jackson in turn created the infor-
mal, backdoor waiver process alluded to earlier.12 8 One of two things
must occur to relieve the pressure on the system: either the age of
accountability must be raised to fifteen or the waiver age must be low-
ered to thirteen. The former solution is probably not realistic in terms
of the kind of legislative opposition it would have to overcome . 2  The
juvenile court judges seem to favor the latter solution.'
Of course, the conflict can always be resolved by the courts al-
though the Georgia courts have not displayed in this matter a propensity
for conflict resolution. Two decisions' by Colorado and West Virginia
courts, however, deserve mention at this point because they demonstrate
an acute understanding of the age factors and juvenile jurisdictional
concepts involved.
Although the Colorado jurisdictional provisions have been covered
previously,3 2 it might be helpful to recount them briefly. The maximum
jurisdictional age of the juvenile court is eighteen.' Except for chil-
dren fourteen and older charged with commission of crimes of violence
punishable by life imprisonment or death,"3 the juvenile court has
exclusive original jurisdiction over children alleged to be delinquent on
the basis of criminal conduct.3 5 Jurisdiction may be waived in the case
'See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
1'Such a change would follow closely on the heels of a recent revision of the Georgia Code
that abrogated the use of conclusive and rebuttable ages of capacity in favor of a single age of
accountability. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-701 (1971). See note 52 supra for a discussion of former § 26-
301 ([1833] Ga. Laws 143) and the effects of the revision. Moreover, as the Committee Notes
following § 26-701 suggest, age 13 probably represents the oldest age for capacity that would meet
with general acceptance.
'wIhis was the consensus of the judges who attended the 10th Annual Workshop for Juvenile
Court Judges held in Athens, Georgia, on October 5-7, 1971. The judges agreed to press the
legislature to amend the new Code to permit waiver of children as young as 13 to establish a waiver
age that corresponds with the age of criminal responsibility. This would resolve the present donflict.
'People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967); State ex rel.
Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
'
3 See notes 106-110 supra and accompanying text.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(3) (Supp. 1967).
i341d. § 22-1-3(17)(b) (Supp. 1969). The age limitation was changed from 16 to 14 in the 1968
amendments to the Children's Code. Ch. 45, § 1, [1968] Colo. Laws 54. For an explanation of the
age change see note 136 infra.
'Id. §§ 22-1-4(l)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1967).
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of a child fourteen or older charged with commission of a felony of-
fense' although at the time of decision the waiver age was sixteen.,"7
The Code further provides that, except for a child fourteen or older
charged with commission of a crime of violence punishable by life im-
prisonment or death, no child may be charged with a felony other than
in the manner provided.3 8
Confronted with this melange of age factors, the Colorado Su-
preme Court in People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court'39 held that the
legislature, by enacting exclusive means for handling children below a
certain age, intended to bar institution of felony charges against a child
under sixteen years of age.' In effect the court raised the age of crimi-
nal responsibility from ten years of age, as provided elsewhere by stat-
ute, " ' to sixteen years of age, thus placing at the same level the age of
accountability and the waiver age. This conclusion is compelled by logic
once a delinquency proceeding is distinguished from a criminal case on
the basis of age jurisdiction.4 2
The West Virginia example is in virtually all respects identical.
Again, the jurisdictional provisions were covered earlier,4 3 but briefly
are as follows. Children charged with offenses punishable by life impris-
onment or death are excluded from consideration as delinquent chil-
dren, "'44 but otherwise the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases in which a child is accused of a criminal violation.' A child is a
person under eighteen years of age.' Jurisdiction may be waived in the
case of a child sixteen or older, and the case may be transferred for
criminal prosecution. 4 7
11id. § 22-1-4(4)(a) (Supp. 1966). Since the waiver age was lowered from 16 to 14 as a part
of the 1968 amendments to the Children's Code, ch. 45, § 2, [1968] Colo. Laws 54, it is safe to
assume it was lowered as a reaction to the decision in question, People ex reL Terrell v. District
Court, 164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967).
'11People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 442-43, 435 P.2d 763, 765 (1967).
'CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4(4)(b) (Supp. 1969).
111164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967).
1"Id. at 441-43, 435 P.2d at 764-65. Since the age classification has since been changed by
the legislature from 16 to 14, the court's decision now applies to children under 14 years of age
rather than children under 16 years of age. See CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4(4)(b) (Supp.
1969).
"'CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-4 (1963).
"'See the court's discussion in 164 Colo. at 443-45, 435 P.2d at 764-66.
"'See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text.
...W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4(2) (1966).
1id. § 49-5-3 (1966).
"'Id. § 49-5-2 (Supp. 1972).
"71d. § 49-5-14(3) (1966).
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In State ex reL Slatton v. Boles,148 the West Virginia court noted
that no provision was made for waiver of jurisdiction over a child under
sixteen years of age. Since the legislature chose to use age as a dividing
line for. classification purposes, the court reasoned that it must have
intended that a person under the age of sixteen was incapable of com-
mitting crime. The court therefore held that the age of accountability,
except in capital cases, had been elevated to sixteen, the waiver age.'
Again, the age of accountability and the waiver age assume the same
level once criminal and juvenile jurisdiction are clearly separated on the
basis of age.
The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code were aware that, in terms
of juvenile court jurisdiction, the age of criminal responsibility has little
importance in the majority of states. Juvenile court acts generally sup-
plant criminal court jurisdiction over children above the age of criminal
responsibility who might otherwise be held accountable for their crimi-
nal acts in a criminal court. They also recognized the interrelationship
between the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the age of accountabil-
ity in criminal court and treated the problem of the age of accountability
in terms of allocating jurisdiction between the juvenile and criminal
courts. Their draft is as follows:
(1) A person shall not be tried for or convicted of an offense if:
(a) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the of-
fense he was less than sixteen years of age [in which case the
Juvenile Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction]; or
(b) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the of-
fense he was sixteen or seventeen years of age, unless:
(i) the Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction over him, or,
(ii) the Juvenile Court has entered an order waiving
jurisdiction and consenting to the institution of criminal
proceedings against him.'
The draftsmen noted that the penal laws traditionally had always
fixed ages of absolute and presumptive incapacity to commit crime. The
juvenile court acts, while merely superimposed on existing provisions,
had established their own jurisdictional age limits and thus reflected
14l147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
"1d. at 682-86, 130 S.E.2d at 197-200.
'MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Subsection (2) of§ 4.10 pro-
vides for transfer from criminal court to juvenile court of proceedings against a person within the
age group described in subsection (1).
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entirely new policy. While the law establishing an age of criminal re-
sponsibility has remained relatively stable for centuries, its practical
significance has progressively diminished because of the gradual exten-
sion of jurisdiction by the juvenile court over children above the age of
accountability. The Model Penal Code provision was drafted to emascu-
late the legal issue of criminal capacity and to hold an individual under
sixteen accountable only in juvenile court, where the traditional concept
of incapacity had no application. By conferring upon juvenile courts
exclusive jurisdiction over persons under sixteen, the Model Penal Code
allows the juvenile court to achieve its avowedly ameliorative ends in
the area of conduct where the need for amelioration is most crucial -
serious offenses. This is also the policy behind giving the juvenile court
decisionmaking responsibility for determining whether juvenile or crim-
inal proceedings should be maintained in cases of persons sixteen and
seventeen years of age. 5'
The Model Penal Code formulation indicates that an age of crimi-
nal responsibility was made an archaic concept by enactment of juvenile
court laws, which were unknown to the common law. Having an age of
accountability is neither helpful nor appropriate in light of juvenile court
jurisdictional age limits and waiver procedures. For example, the prob-
lem in Georgia could be satisfactorily resolved as follows. The statute'
relating to the age of accountability should be abolished outright. At the
same time, the waiver age limit of the juvenile court could be lowered
from fifteen to thirteen years of age, as the juvenile court judges have
suggested, 53 or could be maintained at its present level.' Assuming the
latter choice, this would have the effect of granting to the juvenile court
exclusive jurisdiction over all children under the age of fifteen. Such a
child could never be the subject of a criminal prosecution, since the
juvenile court would not be authorized to waive jurisdiction over the
child. Nor could the superior court take original jurisdiction over such
a child since the Juvenile Court Code provides that any child under the
age of seventeen coming before another court must be transferred forth-
...MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).
"'GA. CODE ANN. § 26-701 (1971).
ImSee note 130 supra.
114f one must think in terms of age of accountability, this would have the effect of raising the
age of accountability to 15. See generally People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437,
435 P.2d 763 (1967); State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963). The
difficulties of achieving this end in Georgia have been discussed elsewhere. See note 129 supra and
accompanying text.
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with to the juvenile court.'55 Under the new formulation this transfer
would be mandatory upon the superior court since the main supporting
pillar of the Jackson v. Balkcom decision-the age of accountabil-
ity-would have been removed." 6
With respect to the remaining cases of children between the ages
of fifteen and seventeen, the juvenile court would have original jurisdic-
tion. The juvenile court would be the sole functionary to decide in which
court action should be commenced against the child. If a child under
seventeen were brought before another court for any reason, that court
would be required to transfer the child to the juvenile court, even if it
meant only that the juvenile court would transfer the child back to the
court in which the proceeding originated.
Realistically, there are cases in which the offender should be trans-
ferred to superior court to be tried as an adult. Identifying these cases
is an enormous, very critical task, for it is true, as the draftsmen of the
Uniform Juvenile Court Act suggest, that "whether or not to transfer
is one of the most important decisions the juvenile court makes
... .,, It is important that the juvenile court and not some other
court be the body to make the waiver decision. In this respect Georgia
is not alone in re-examining the efficacy of concurrent jurisdiction be-
tween juvenile and criminal courts. A critic of the proposed Pennsyl-
vania Juvenile Court Act (which, like Georgia, follows the basic outline
of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act) also takes to task the criminal court
jurisdiction allowed by the proposed act: "to allow an adult criminal
court to determine in the manner specified . . . which persons should
be granted the juvenile court privileges is violative of these [Kent v.
United States18 ] due process requirements." '159 At least under the pro-
posed jurisdictional formulation suggested for Georgia, the juvenile
court would not be in the position of abnegating its waiver decisionmak-
ing responsibility by engaging in a backdoor waiver process for children
between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, as is the case now. Under the
proposed jurisdictional structure, each child as to whom waiver is a
'0GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-90i (1971).
Iwrhe presence of a statute establishing an age of criminal responsibility and the apparent
conflict between that statute and the statute setting a juvenile court jurisdictional age limit seems
to be the only rational basis for the Jackson decision. See notes 71-116 supra and accompanying
text for an analysis and evaluation of the Jackson decision.
' 'UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 34, Comment.
158383 U.S. 541 (1966).
'"Note, Proposed Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, 75 DICK. L. REv. 235, 240 (1971).
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possibility would receive a waiver hearing on that question. At least he
would receive his day in court on the issue of waiver, as contemplated
by the Kent decision. All other children as to whom waiver would not
be a possibility - those under the age of fifteen - in any event would
be treated in the juvenile court.
As previously pointed out,16 0 the committee notes following the
provision setting the age of criminal responsibility 1 ' adopt in spirit the
above proposal. While intended to explain the effect of the new age of
accountability, the notes are an effective argument against the necessity
of having an age of accountability at all. The effect of the present section
is to create a conclusive presumption of incapacity to commit crime on
the part of a child under the age of thirteen. He may nevertheless be
subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court since the committee notes
adopt the distinction that a delinquent act based on conduct described
as a crime by local, state, or federal law, 1 2 is not a crime; hence incapac-
ity to commit a crime is not a relevant consideration in the juvenile
court.8
3
Georgia thus uses the age of criminal responsibility as a dividing
line between exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction (below thirteen) and
the area of concurrent jurisdiction shared with the superior court (thir-
teen to seventeen). The age of accountability is an inappropriate divid-
ing line, however, because it is essentially a tool of the criminal law, a
product of an era when there were no special courts to deal with chil-
dren. Enactment of the juvenile court laws, with their special age juris-
diction provisions, marked the conceptual demise of the age of account-
ability as a useful tool. In a delinquency proceeding, it is simply no
longer relevant."4
The Model Penal Code provision mentioned above offers a more
acceptable solution. It abandons the concept of age of accountability in
favor of establishing a general jurisdictional age limit (eighteen) and an
16OSee note 52 supra.
"'IGA. CODE ANN. § 26-701 (1971).
" See id. § 24A-401(e)(l) (1971).
1Id. § 26-701, Comment (1971). Again, however, one should be aware of the California case
of In re Gladys R., I Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970), in which the California
Supreme Court held that evidence should have been submitted to prove that a 12-year-old girl
appreciated the wrongfulness of her act before she could be adjudicated a ward of the state (14 is
California's age of presumptive incapacity).
"
4See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957). See generally People
exrel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967); State exreL Slatton v. Boles,
147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
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intermediate age level (sixteen), below which the juvenile court has ex-
clusive, original jurisdiction that is not waivable and above which (six-
teen to eighteen) it has original jurisdiction that may be waived in
certain cases on decision of the juvenile court.165 In those jurisdictions
in which the juvenile jurisdictional provisions operate as intended, the
same result is in effect achieved. 66 Since the courts of Georgia,'67
Idaho, 16 8 and Nebraska, 6 ' however, have not been as vigilant as others
in preserving intact the original, exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, perhaps the legislatures of those states will consider adopting the
Model Penal Code provisions and freeing the juvenile jurisdictional
provisions to function as intended.
One consideration remains to be discussed. For purposes of juvenile
court jurisdiction, should the child's age be determined as of the time
the offense was committed or as of the time the proceeding is instituted?
Suppose a child commits an offense while he is within the range of
juvenile age jurisdiction, but action is not brought against him until after
he is beyond the jurisdictional age limit. What should be done with him?
The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code suggest that the age at the time
of commission of the offense is most relevant because of the child's
diminished capacity at that time to commit the wrong. Why, they ask,
should the mere passage of time operate to deny the juvenile court
jurisdiction over the case?70
Most jurisdictions ostensibly take the approach suggested by the
Model Penal Code.' Others, however, seem to favor determination of
jurisdiction according to the age of the person at the time proceedings
'6MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"'See cases cited note 26 supra. The decisions in the following cases are especially well
reasoned: People ex reL Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967); State ex
rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957); Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss.
374, 57 So. 2d 267 (1952); State ex reL Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
'"Jackson v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954).
reState v. Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 300 P.2d 491 (1956).
" Fugate-v. Ronin, 167 Neb. 70, 91 N.W.2d 240 (1958); State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18
N.W.2d 101 (1945).
'MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).
'"E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 604(a) (West 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(3)
(1961); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-12 (1968), § 571-11(1) (Supp. 1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3213
(1956); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1570(B), 13:1571 (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-2(e)(1)
(Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 72A (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.115 (1971);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.061(2) (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-603(b), -610 (Supp. 1971);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-211 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 62.050 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169:2(111) (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-20 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-28 (1968);
N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 714(a) (McKinney 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (a) (Supp.
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are commenced.'7 2 In still other instances, the intent is not clear. 73 The
draftsmen of the Model Penal Code suggest that when the statutes are
silent the courts tend to favor determination of age jurisdiction as of the
time of the proceeding. 74
The difficulty with the solution proposed by the draftsmen is that,
while commission of the act may have been reflective of the child's
capacity at that time, reality suggests that he may no longer be amena-
ble to the rehabilitative treatment afforded by the juvenile process be-
cause of his present age. The decision has correctional implications. Not
only may this child not be responsive to treatment, but he may pose a
problem to effective treatment of other, younger children. 75 On the
other hand, it may seem unfair to make such a decision without consid-
eration of factors other than age. For that reason, the best approach
would authorize the juvenile court to assume original jurisdiction over
all youths between the maximum age limit and twenty-one years of age
(or the age of majority), in cases where the offense occurred during the
period when the youth was within the jurisdictional age range. The
juvenile court probably would waive jurisdiction over most of these
1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-28 (1970); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 55-10-79 (Supp. 1971; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 635(a) (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-175 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-3 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.4(b) (Supp.
1971).
'
2These statutes generally require transfer of a child to the juvenile court if it appears to the
transferring court that he is a child or is at that time below the jurisdictional age of the juvenile
court. E.G., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 363 (1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-65 (1960); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24A-901 (1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.64 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-09 (Supp.
1971); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.25 (Page Supp. 1971); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.478 (1971);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1188 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-209 (Supp. 1971); TeX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 12 (1971).
'
713E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.886 (Supp. 1972) provides that if during pendency of a
criminal proceeding in another court, the court learns that the defendant is under 17 years of age,
the case must be transferred to thejuvenile court. This would suggest that jurisdiction is determined
as of the time of the hearing. However, the Code elsewhere provides for transfer if it appears to
such court that the person was under 17 years of age at the time the act was committed. Id.
§ 27.3178 (598.3) (1962).
...MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957). The draftsmen show the
following as favoring this interpretation: Davis v. State, 259 Ala. 212, 66 So.2d 714 (1953);
Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (1931); People v. Ross, 235 Mich. 433, 209 N.W. 663
(1926); Farr v. State, 199 Miss. 637, 24 So.2d 186 (1946); State v. Adams, 316 Mo. 157, 289 S.W.
948 (1926); Ex parte Albiniano, 62 R.I. 429, 6 A.2d 554 (1939); Smith v. State, 99 Tex. Crim.
432, 269 S.W. 793 (1925); State v. Melvin, 144 Wash. 687, 258 P. 859 (1927).
They list the following as contra the interpretation: United States v. Fotto, 103 F. Supp. 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); White v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 736, 47 S.W.2d 548 (1932); State v. Cable,
181 N.C. 554, 107 S.E. 132 (1921); Sams v. State, 133 Tenn. 188, 180 S.W. 173 (1915).
175Paulsen, supra note 11, at 58-59.
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cases and transfer them to criminal court, but an examination of consid-
erations in addition to age may in some cases indicate that a youth
would be responsive to treatment as a juvenile. Of course, if such person
is beyond the age of majority at the time he appears before the criminal
court, such court has proper jurisdiction.'76
CONCLUSION
Legislatures, and to some extent the courts, have paid homage to
the rehabilitative ends of the juvenile court but at the same time have
sought, either by statutory design' or court decision,17 to compromise
and make exceptions to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 79 These
attempts represent a paternalistic, solicitous attitude toward the func-
tion of the juvenile court and a mistrust of its basically ameliorative
aims. This attitude indicates a substantial skepticism of the role of the
juvenile court as a law enforcement agency; certainly its capacity to deal
with more serious offenders is often doubted. A prevalent attitude con-
ceives the juvenile court as a social agency whose function is to adjust
minor difficulties between the child and the law. This view of the role
of the juvenile court would inevitably conflict with the apparent need
of the community to express disapproval of antisocial conduct through
the medium of the criminal sanction. 80
The attitude characterized above represents an essentially emo-
tional reaction, which is heavily influenced by the two factors of age and
seriousness of the offense. The older the offender or the more serious
the offense (or some combination of the two), the stronger will be the
emotional response of the community. The response of the community
may be particularly intense in reaction to an individual case and may
even find public expression in the form of legislative action or court
decision. In Georgia, for example, public response clearly prompted the
1953 amendment to the Act of 1951 eliminating exclusiveness of juvenile
court jurisdiction'8' and may have influenced the decision in Jackson v.
Balkcom. 18
"78See, e.g., State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 555, 102 N.W.2d 696, 702 (1960); State ex rel.
Pett v. Jackson, 252 Minn. 418, 422, 90 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1958); State exrel. Knutson v. Jackson,
249 Minn. 246, 253, 82 N.W.2d 234, 239 (1957).
'See notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
"78See, e.g., Jackson v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954); State v. Lindsey, 78 Idaho
241, 300 P.2d 491 (1956); State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18 N.W.2d 101 (1945).
'Such attempts have been criticized by those close to the juvenile court movement. See, e.g.,
S. RuBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 50-51 (2d ed. 1961).
180See note I I supra.
"'No. 555, § 3, [1953] Ga. Laws Nov.-Dec. Sess. 87.
raT he Jackson case certainly bore all of the traits of a controversial case that could be expected
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President legislative policy, however, reflects a preference that the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court should be exclusive as well as origi-
nal."8 3 The question remains whether the court decisions are still an
impediment to exclusive jurisdiction under the new juvenile court codes
or whether current philosophy dictates a different result today. The
argument has been advanced here that available information suggests
that the cases ought to be decided differently today.
First of all, most jurisdictions have classified what otherwise would
be a crime as a delinquent act.8 4 A delinquent child is not a criminal
nor is his act under these circumstances regarded as a criminal act.'85
Juvenile court jurisdictional provisions have not only changed the defini-
tional nature of a child's conduct; they have served as well to change
the conceptual nature of the proceeding. A delinquency proceeding is
not a criminal case.'86 Since the constitutional grants of jurisdiction to
other courts refer to jurisdiction over "criminal cases,"'8 7 it is difficult
to imagine how a court could conceive that the juvenile court jurisdic-
to arouse a strong visceral reaction from the community. Although the defendant was under 16
years of age at the time, the offense he had committed was rape, an especially emotion-generating
offense in the South, where, at least until Furman v. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972), it was still
punishable by death. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1971). Moreover, the time was 1953
and the seriousness of the matter was compounded by the fact that the defendant was black and
the victim was white. The jury expressed its repugnance by sentencing the youth to death by
electrocution. This was a tragic case by any measure, for it was precisely to avoid this sort of result
that juvenile court laws were enacted. See discussion in State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 36-37, 104
A.2d 21, 22 (1954).
The significance of the Jackson case to juvenile jurisdiction is that it sanctioned concurrent
jurisdiction with the superior court over offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. Since
that time, cases involving less emotion and less community reaction have been tried by the superior
court. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 119 Ga. App. 105, 166 S.E.2d 617 (1969) (defendant, 16 years of
age, was convicted of burglary and larceny for breaking and entering and stealing beer, candy,
cigarettes, and a small amount of cash). While the emotionalism is gone, the rule of law remains.
'For expression of legislative policy in the three states whose courts have rejected the concept
of exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court, see GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301 (1971); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1803 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 43-202, -211 (1968).
'See statutes cited note 8 supra. In particular, since Georgia and Nebraska are two of the
states whose courts have declared that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not exclusive, see
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(e)(l) (1971); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-201(4) (1968).
1'The civil nature of a juvenile proceeding is almost universally recognized. See statutes cited
note 32 supra.
'"See People ex rel. Rodello v. District Court, 164 Colo. 530, 535, 436 P.2d 672, 675 (1968);
People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 444-45, 435 P.2d 763, 766 (1967); State ex
rel. Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 683-85, 130 S.E.2d 192, 198-99 (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.215(1) (1971).
"'See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI, § IV, I; IDAHO CONsT. art. 5, § 20.
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tional provisions are in conflict with the criminal court's jurisdiction to
try criminal cases.'
Secondly, the concept of age of criminal responsibility is an anach-
ronism and has no modern relevance in light of juvenile court laws. It
should be abandoned in favor of establishing an intermediate age level
below which the juvenile court would have exclusive, original, and non-
waivable jurisdiction and above which the juvenile court would have
exclusive, original jurisdiction that in certain cases could be waived."9
In any event, the important consideration is that if a child is to be
tried in a criminal court, a statutory scheme ought to be devised
whereby the allocation of jurisdiction is more certain and does not
depend upon subjective factors."" The presumption ought to be that the
child is entitled to be treated as a juvenile unless some reason exists to
suggest otherwise. The larger question is concerned with who should
make the decision regarding how the child is to be handled. It is no
doubt true, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
stated in Black v. United States,"' that "[t]reatment as a juvenile is not
a statutory bounty which can be withdrawn lightly. ' 192 Indeed, the thrust
of this article is that it should not be "withdrawn" at all, but only waived
upon the decision of the juvenile court.
'
T For decisions holding that there is no conflict of jurisdiction see note 26 supra.
"'See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
" Consideration of subjective factors, e.g., prior record, age, seriousness of offense, etc., is
appropriate at the waiver hearing in juvenile court, but it is not appropriate at the beginning stages
of a case when neither court has assumed jurisdiction. The superior court may be too inclined,
because of community pressure, to take the more infamous cases.
"9355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
0id. at 105.
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